This article is intended as a contribution to the analysis of ethnicity, nation, and class in Cyprus. We will focus particularly on the Greek-Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in the south of the island, although such a discussion cannot leave completely out of consideration developments in the internationally unrecognised breakaway regime in the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). We would like to stress that Cyprus is still impacted by the legacy of colonialism and its continuing effect through coloniality in its various forms, but that this must be seen within the context of the changing and global parameters of capital in Cyprus. We seek to show ways in which the left-wing forces in Cyprus, and particularly AKEL, have dealt with and may still deal with recent challenges in the contemporary period. In the early 1980s, Floya Anthias and Ron Ayres1 identified the dialogical relationship between nationalism and the struggle for socialism as well as the sidelining of class politics when the struggle for socialism is coloured by nationalism. Whilst there are features specific to the Cypriot context, where the left is confronted with complex national questions and ethnic and racial conflicts, these issues also play out elsewhere2.
Constitutional arrangements on the island after the London-Zurich independence agreement of 1959 reflected the continuation of colonialism in Cyprus. One prime instance is found in the Treaty of Guarantee that increased the colonial presence to three Powers — Britain, Greece, and Turkey — by establishing their right to intervene in Cyprus3. Britain established military bases, designated as ‘British sovereign territory’ which were de facto a part of NATO. In addition, and very importantly, it espoused the colonialist assumptions that Britain harboured throughout its empire about the givenness of ethnic allegiance and conflicting political interests on the part of Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking populations on the island. These assumptions constructed two antagonistic ethnic-community groups, granting each of them separate political powers, sanctioned in the Constitution. The core insight that ethnicity and class4 are connected remains essential for analysing Cyprus in the current period. By December 1963, a mere three years after independence, power-sharing between the Greek Cypriots (78%) and the Turkish Cypriots (18%) collapsed and intercommunal strife ensued. The current demarcation line was enforced in 1974, when a coup by the Greek junta with local para-fascists — the EOKA-B (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) — overthrew the Government, aiming to assert the political union of Cyprus with Greece. Turkey, having invoked the Treaty of Guarantee, invaded the island and has occupied it to this day, holding 34% of its territory in the north. With large British bases, Greek and Turkish troops, as well as UN forces, Cyprus is one of most milita-rised countries in the world5.
Despite the destruction that divided its people and decimated the country’s territory and much of its agricultural resources, the RoC saw a massive post-1974 development — depicted as an ‘economic miracle’6 — based on the cheap labour of displaced persons, environmental destruction, and the development of mass tourism. Despite these socio-economic transformations, the post-colonial class structure’s pyramid of wealth and income essentially remained in place. Several post-1974 developments require a different analytical framework, which we must address:
1. Cyprus has been divided, with the southern part of the country con-stituting the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the northern part, occupied by Turkey, constituting the unrecognised break-away TRNC. The latter is less developed and remains heavily de-pendent on Turkey. Currently, the RoC, the focus of our analysis, can be seen as part of a global capitalist regime with characteristics specific to Cyprus. The country’s integration into this regime and its specific function within it have been further intensified by its 2004 entry into the EU, its 2013 banking crisis, and broader transformations in global capital with its financialised reconfiguration and the centrality of what has been termed platform capital. Financialisaton has made the RoC a major hub for banking and financial services and a tax haven in the eastern Mediterranean following the destruction of Beirut with the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s, as well as the collapse of the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1989-1991. This was the shift that led to the largest financial city, Limassol, being dubbed ‘Moscow on the Med’. The RoC was transformed into an EU tax-and-passport oasis: the banking sector was eight times the size of the real economy. The country’s economy has become a service economy based on tourism, and a tax haven with financial services. Russian capital has been particularly important, even though it has been dealt a major blow with the 2014-2021 sanctions targeting Russian assets (banks, financial institutions, energy, aviation, and
These colonialist assumptions constructed two antagonistic ethnic-community groups, granting each of them separate political powers, sanctioned in the Constitution.
shipping companies) and individuals (oligarchs and state officials). The RoC had been dependent on Russian capital flows until it came to terms with the consequences of western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine7. There are also significant Russian investments in the northern occupied area.
Following the RoC’s financial crisis of 2012-13, the EU ‘rescue deal’, with the confiscation of bank deposits and the closure of key banks, not only destroyed banking but imposed a stringent austerity package on everyone. The right-wing government of Nicos Anastasiades ensured the proliferation of the accumulation regime by imposing Thatcherite austerity, whilst boosting construction along with finance capital by granting Cypriot citizenship to rich investors as ‘compensation’ (the so-called ‘Golden Passport’). Massive construction with skyscrapers in coastal cities ensued following the selling of European passports through the ‘citizenship by investment’ programme8. The economy and profits recovered, but average wages were reduced and stagnated at a level lower than that of 2008. According to a report on ‘Wealth Inequality in the 21st Century’, ‘Cyprus saw one of the sharpest rises in wealth concentration in Europe, with the share of national wealth held by the top 10% of earners growing by 16 percentage points, from 50.7% in 2000 to 66.7% in 2023. Between 2007 and 2020, the country’s ‘Golden Passport’ scheme attracted wealthy foreign investors and drove up property prices. Unlike other tourism-driven island nations where inequality fell, such as Barba-dos (down 6.7 points) and the Maldives (down 18.5), Cyprus saw wealth increasingly concentrated in finance, property, and offshore sectors. The country’s 2012–13 banking crisis and subsequent €10 billion bailout also contributed to wage stagnation and underemployment.’9. Austerity policies have continued under the subsequent Christodoulides Government.
In relation to class, there has been a growth of precarity, class frag-mentation and the fracturing of class allegiances with the growth of a large service and administrative class, and the enlargement of the state alongside the proliferation of political parties including the far right10. Important to note is the growth of precarious employment11, largely experienced by migrants12.
2. With the discovery of gas and contestations around it, the characteristics of hydrocarbon capitalism are exacerbating the conflict between the major players in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey and have led to greater links to Israel13.
3. The growth of migration has converted Cyprus from a traditional out-migration country to a migration destination and a receiving country for asylum seekers. Cyprus is heavily dependent on migrant labour, with official data putting the migrant workforce (comprising EU and third-country citizens) at 32.3% of Cyprus’s total workforce, and women making up more than 57% of the total migrant population14. If we include those in the total workforce who are estimated to be working in the rather large informal economy the figure would easily reach 40%, given that the informal sector is estimated to be over 25% of the Cypriot economy15. The exploitation of migrant labour allowed the continuation of capitalist accumulation — migrant labour’s contribution to economic growth has been over 54%16. In the post-1974 national development strategy, cheap migrant labour would underpin the continued pathway to growth and profits, replacing Cypriots who no longer were prepared to perform low-skilled jobs for low wages, as they were becoming more affluent and educated.
With accession to the EU in 2004, Cyprus joined the new securitised migration regime together with other EU member states on the eastern and southern borders of the EU, thus transformed into ‘border guards’ of the EU fortress17. Migration and asylum flows have been weaponised by the far right on the island that has now, as in many EU countries, managed to enter parliament.
4. Another form of migration is the growth of elite and financial services which provide lucrative positions for non-Cypriot high-earning personnel. This has converted many parts of both the rural and urban landscape into rich enclaves with expensive housing developments. More recently there has been an influx of rich Israelis on the island which have followed earlier Lebanese, Russian, and Chinese flows, increasing the price of land and rent in many cities, making it unaffordable for those with an average income. This has converted it into a multicultural space but without the substructure to manage it and without a multicultural sensitivity on the part of large numbers of Cypriots.
5. There has been an increase in nationalism, a surge of populist politics as well as a virulent and growing far right, with a neo-Nazi Party represented in Parliament. This is part of a global trend but it is also connected to the fracturing of left-wing forces and the concrete failure of the left in Cyprus — where AKEL is one of the largest communist parties in Europe18 — to resist these developments19, signalling the continuation of a policy of so-called ‘pragmatism’ on the part of the left, noted by Anthias and Ayres in 1983,20. In 2008, AKEL’s leader, Demetris Christofias won the presidency, raising hopes for reunification and reconciliation, but the failure to reunite the country, together with the financial crisis, led to its declining support. AKEL faced successive defeats in three subsequent presidential elections. At the same time there has been an adoption of a European identity on the island which rather than leading to a less fractured notion of belonging and citizenship has served to amplify the othering of Muslims, particularly Turkish settlers and migrants, with increasing racialisation of different groups, violence, and the politics of hate. There is however a vibrant anti-racist movement opposing this, but society remains polarised.
6. Finally, since the early 1980s, when Anthias and Ayres’s work was published,21 there has been a growth of feminism on the island with a greater recognition of gender issues and inequalities. Policies around gender have been an outcome largely of EU directives and their implementation, albeit in somewhat limited ways. However, the role of gender in issues of nationalism and national struggle is important to note22.
Having sketched out some of the central issues facing the left in Cyprus, we will begin by explaining how we theorise the connections between ethnicity, nation, and capitalist relations through a decolonial Marxist-informed framing which we believe harmonises with a more intersectional and translocational approach to social inequalities and the pursuit of capitalist interests23.
In our analysis, ethnicity and nation are parameters of difference that articulate with capital, the state, and wider class projects. Ethnicity in Cyprus, as in other social formations, has always evolved through the material and political interests of capital, alongside the contestations and struggles around these. This includes the material and political needs of capital accumulation, the necessary forms at the discursive and ideological level for their achievement, the practices of economic elites, and colonial forms of power, alongside the agency and struggles of different sorts that contest, negotiate, or counter these. Anthias and Ayres argued that in the long history of colonialism in Cyprus up to the British annexation of the island in 1878, Turkish-speaking and Greek-speaking populations were mainly defined and saw themselves through faith-based categories rather than as distinctive ‘ethnic ‘groups with different cultural and political interests. There were crucial commonalities of rural peas-ant life, and the hardships of poverty. Peasants were subjected to the hegemony of British colonialism which favoured old elites, out of whom the bourgeoisie were formed (wealthy merchants, manufacturers and professionals, as well as large landowners, a prime example being the Greek Orthodox Church).
These were manifested in cultural similarities in terms of food, social interaction, and by the peasant population having worked alongside each other in the fields and at harvest time. The British administration favoured this rising bourgeoisie through policies that facilitated the capitalisation of the economy, a system of heavy taxation, and land reforms that often resulted in widespread peasant debt and land loss. The constitutional arrangements when Britain annexed the island imposed ethnic belonging and identity on the two main religious groups, Muslims and Christians, and endowed them with a purported antagonistic political interest. The constitution created different political constituencies — a practice found throughout the British Empire. In this way ‘difference’ was harnessed to the pursuit of colonial rule’s interests and the consolidation of its power and reach over the whole of the Cypriot population. Nationalism and class politics emerged in this context24.
However, this does not mean, in our view, that ethnicity can be reduced to class. Whilst ethnicity cannot be understood as merely a mechanical product of class relations under capitalism, at the same time its concrete form and characteristics cannot be understood outside these class relations25. Collectivity and solidarity are emergent properties linked to sociality and are generic to the functioning of ‘the social’. Throughout history they have taken different forms as well as being full of conflict and contestation. But ‘group-making’ practices — how notions of collectivity and belonging manifest themselves discursively, experientially, and organisationally — cannot be understood outside economic and political processes. It is important to note that ‘group-making’ in this regard is not restricted to ethnic and national group constructions. Such group-making also assumes class, gender, and many other forms which give rise to situated notions of insiders and outsiders. As in discussions of racial capitalism26, race may not have originated with capitalism, but capitalism harnesses, transforms, and weaponises racial, gender, and class categories27.
Paradoxically, despite the tragedy of mass dispossession, displacement, loss of lives and loss of territory, the tragedy of 1974 led to the opening up of social reflection and critique. The events shattered long-held beliefs in Enosis - the nationalist project of union with Greece - and exposed the failures of that nationalist-irredentist ideal. This crisis created an unprecedented space for self-criticism among intellectuals and politically engaged citizens, prompting them to question what had gone wrong and why. Cypriots began to explore alternative ideas and seek inspiration from anti-colonial movements and struggles for independence. Crucial was the contribution of many diasporic scholars, who saw the root-causes of the conflict in Cyprus by connecting it to colonialism, imperialism, as well as the internal politics, nationalism, uneven development, and the social and class relations in Cyprus. At that time, Anthias and Ayres and others28 saw the political search for social transformation as part and parcel of decolonisation and national self-determination. This generated social imaginaries, unleashing forms of sociological as well as political imagination that were present at least until the 1990s.
‘Group-making’ practices — how notions of collectivity and belonging manifest themselves discursively, experientially, and organisationally— cannot be understood outside economic and political processes.
The class-nation nexus should, we believe, be seen as part of a more intersectional and nuanced analysis which can incorporate gender and other configurations of difference and inequality today in the context of the transformations in Cyprus we highlighted earlier. Our aim here is to sketch the potential for a decolonial matrix of power in colonial regimes, which interconnect colonial systems of control that continued to shape political and social relations (economy, authority, gender/sexuality, knowledge and subjectivity), even after formal independence, taking Cyprus as the example. In this context we flag the need to rethink and reinsert key concepts that seem to have been erased, underestimated, or undervalued in most writing about Cyprus29. The aim would be not only to highlight the need to understand how class and class struggle appear within the making and remaking of the Cyprus problem but also how this is manifested in strategies on the political left on the island.
In relation to more general decolonial debates, we can say that class and class struggle have become tangential, despite earlier decolonial writings30 seeing them as central to the anti-colonial struggles of the 20th century. The notion of class was understood, however, primarily as an economic category and force in what has been criticised as an economistic reading of Marxism. Today, despite the revival of interest in class in social theory, its importance as a social relation within much decolonial writing and intersectional analysis of inequalities and subordinations has been underdeveloped31.
However, there have been developments in social theory that explore notions of class often in debate with Marxism in the work of Foucault, Bourdieu, neo-Weberians, and neo Gramscians32. There is new energy in the ways decolonisation is being addressed in the social sciences also, where it sometimes unfortunately functions as a buzz word.
Rethinking the Cyprus problem
Fifty years after 1974, when the island was de facto divided, we can look back with a clearer critical eye on the events and processes that led to the Cyprus catastrophe. Although the Cyprus problem has unique elements, it is wrong to depict it as sui generis, a kind of exception that cannot be compared to any other conflict. The general phenomenon is familiar: ‘empire preserved’ within a specific political context imposed by Cold War international politics33. It is a story of imperialism, expansionism, and irredentist nationalisms, nation-building and state-crafting, with the interaction of all these factors. The clash over and around Cyprus is part of a common troubled history of partition also seen in India, Pakistan, Palestine, Ireland, Bosnia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka34.
From 1979 on, Anthias and Ayres35 have pinpointed this crucial aspect of the Cyprus problem. They noted:
Ethnic consciousness in Cyprus was able, at the popular level, to articulate class elements. This occurred through the development of the progressive movement in Cyprus, which was able to see national liberation as a first stage in the struggle against the international bourgeoisie. But nationalist ideas came to be over-represented in the class struggle in a way which prevented the complete development of horizontal class interests in the struggle for independence36.
The tension between national and class projects is always present. These tensions and contradictions continue within the left revolutionary movement and in the strategies of left-wing parties. Even when the left takes power, we see compromises and failure to seize the moment, not only because of counterforces within liberal democracies but also because of the ‘pragmatism’ regarded as necessary to hold on to power37. In addition, historically there have been many cases where revolutionary liberation movements that defeat and expel colonialists are then transformed into oppressive regimes, particularly where the class programme of redistribution of wealth and income gives way to the imperative of ‘national development’, for instance when left anti-colonial organisations in power were defeated, or were coopted or eventually capitulated as in Vietnam, Algeria, Ghana, Guyana, Egypt, etc.
Moreover, there is the question of whether and how both national and class politics incorporate gender and ‘race’ or fail to do so. Nationalisms have, on the whole, clear notions of women as reproducers of the nation38, and ethnic and race ‘otherness’ as a contaminant of the nation. This limits the position of women and minoritised and racialised groups and defines their intersections (in the case, for example, of the role and positioning of ‘migrantised’ women, usually in the direction of unequal and exploited social relations. Unfortunately, however, we can see this mirrored in left and revolutionary parties where issues of gender and race are often collapsed into class, and women and gender inequalities are sidelined in the interests of class politics. History shows that a class politics that fails to consider how other forms of inequality are positioned within the analysis of class and anti-capitalist struggle cannot effectively deliver the outcomes necessary for a social transformation of unequal relations between the classes themselves and is bound to fail.
AKEL has evolved pragmatically but has not been able to transform fully in relation to issues of nation and patriotism, keen as it is to hold on to the patriotic brand in the face of accusations of being unpatriotic. But it has moved forward in its position on gender, sexuality, race, and migration. It strongly advocates a federal, bizonal solution and frames patriotism around sovereignty and federal reunification rather than ethnic chauvinism. On gender and sexuality, it endorses formal gender-equality measures and some reforms but progress is slow: women are underrepresented and the party approaches issues like reproductive and LGBTI+ rights cautiously. On race and migration AKEL rhetorically opposes xenophobia and supports migrants’ labour rights but is cautious in consistently pushing for a robust, rights-based migration agenda, often constrained by concerns about electoral calculations. Overall, the party has adopted a rather incremental approach in its emphases and tactics, and preserved institutional continuity in its core commitments, but has shied away from any deep cultural or policy shifts.
Towards a strategy for the left in Cyprus
In Cyprus we see the reflection of a global trend towards de-democratisation, as well as widening inequalities, economic insecurity, polarisation, and ruptures on both sides of the barbed wire. The political landscape on the island is changing as it is affected by the rapid social changes we noted earlier and their accompanying economic transformations: widening inequalities and economic
Recent statements by AKEL recommend moving beyond celebratory hybridity and narrow identity politics toward solidarity-building, social learning, and commoning that connect theory and praxis.
insecurity and a sense of hopelessness and alienation within working populations which feel they have been ‘left behind’. These are the conditions one would expect to lead to a return to class politics, a return of the left. How then do we interpret the rise of conservative, far-right, fascist, and authoritarian forces globally and in Cyprus? This is neither unprecedented nor strange — the rise of fascism in the interwar period is a classic example of a similar trend. From a broadly Marxist perspective, the fundamental contradictions and social struggles within capitalism are central to social reproduction or transformation. Whilst after Marx and Engels, many socialist traditions collapsed issues of gender, sexuality, race, and other forms of inequality into a narrow concept of class, new approaches within a more Marxist-informed intersectional political economy have attempted to redress this (e.g. racial capitalism, social reproduction theory, and translocational intersectionality)39. Left political parties and movements need to rearticulate their goals with a broader notion of power relations which does not mean sidelining class and the importance of material inequalities but recognises the complex and situated nature of inequality, and the different constituencies of struggle within progressive forces. They must also address the fragmentations, precarity, and transformations within the working class. Coalitions and solidarity-building become central here not only in terms of syndicalist movements but also in terms of links with anti-racist and feminist struggles around the rights and positioning of women, of migrants and of expropriated and super-exploited populations on the peripheries of what may be understood as class groupings - such as asylum seekers, refugees, and other marginalised populations. Unless politics can resonate with such constituencies and broader social concerns that correspond to the subjectivities developed during struggles, they will not succeed. This is the basis for developing effective solidarity politics and policies. Left parties emerge stronger when they are at the forefront of such social issues and are the advocates of those who are excluded, marginalised, and left behind, ‘the wretched of the earth’. This will admittedly not be easy, but it should be seen as a work in progress.40
The Cypriot left is constantly required to rethink strategy to address intertwined national, geopolitical, and social crises in a globalised era. Any compartmentalisation of the national question, any approach that disconnects the division of Cyprus from social struggles and fails to locate it within broader regional, global, and geopolitical contexts, is problematic. Left parties must guard against two different sorts of dangers: Once in power, there is a danger of co-optation, leaving those the party is supposed to represent feeling betrayed and abandoned, as the Syriza example demonstrated. AKEL also suffered from its first experience in government, but it was not coopted, nor was it decimated from within, as Syriza was into six factions41 after it capitulated to the EU, lost power, and Tsipras was replaced by Kasselakis42. At the same time, the idea of power-avoidance — that is, the notion that left parties must shun power to remain radical — pushes the left into a marginal role without being able to provide meaningful alternatives.
AKEL retains strong grassroots ties and a broad civic base but faces long-term decline, ageing membership, youth disengagement, and criticism over economic management during the austerity and the banking crisis43. Since the failure to support the Annan Plan in 2004, which caused confusion and damaged relations with Turkish-Cypriots, the party’s record on the Cyprus problem has been principled. However, it has struggled to integrate national and social programmes into a coherent strategy.
A transitional reading of the Cyprus problem that views federal reunification as part of a broader social transformation is the path forward44. This includes trans-communal organising, creating common institutions and a ‘federal consciousness’, and strengthening ties with Turkish-Cypriot left parties and civic groups to form a cross-community front.
The urgency is to build an anti-nationalist counter-hegemony that reframes citizenship around class, gender and social inequality and fosters everyday co-operative practices. The ‘third space’ for coalition politics is problematic and contested and must be established with caution. However, a coalition of progressive forces offers opportunities for mobilisation which are necessary amidst a right-wing turn. Recent statements by AKEL recommend moving beyond celebratory hybridity and narrow identity politics toward solidarity-building, social learning, and commoning that connect theory and praxis. Intellectuals and civic organisations should expand the terrain of struggle to integrate national, social, and geopolitical questions into a unitary framework.
Of immense importance for the left is the struggle for the rights of migrant workers — they form 40 percent of the working class. Authoritarian and discriminatory practices affecting migrants emerge from both local historical-national dynamics and European-level policies, including securitisation and the ‘clash of civilisations’ framing. This European dissensus, framed by anti-immigrant debates about national identity, migration, and a supposed ‘crisis of multiculturalism and immigration’, is shaping Greek-Cypriot public discourse, as it is doing elsewhere. Addressing it requires a class, antiracist, and gender-based alternative politics45 oriented to transnational belonging46. Far-right and neo-Nazi elements exploit fears of migration to justify coercion and violence, while public debate over migrants has become increasingly polarised and racialised. Cyprus’s prolonged conflict and de facto division enable securitarian responses; militarised and police-centred narratives, sometimes borrowed from abroad, have intensified. Securitisation crowds out discussion of exploitation and emancipation, shifting attention from the social and economic roots of inequality toward policing and exclusion.
In conclusion, facing neoliberal austerity, rising right-wing forces and diplomatic stalemate, the Cypriot left must grow through four interlinked moves: integrating national, class, and social struggles across social lines; energising reunification and reconciliation politics; building an anti-nationalist counter-hegemony based on popular participation; practicing a robust antiracist politics that integrates migrant workers in labour struggles and develops a sturdy gender-equality agenda and cultural politics that goes beyond hybridity. These steps can mobilise popular imaginaries and practical alliances to lead toward reunification, social transformation, and social justice.
Notes
1 Floya Anthias and Ron Ayres, ‘Ethnicity and class in Cyprus’, Race & Class 25(1), 1983, pp. 59-76.
2 Edward Webster and Karin Pamballis (eds),The Unresolved National Question, Left Thought Under Apartheid, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2017.
3 Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut Bozkurt, ‘Rethinking the postcoloni-al Cypriot statehood’, in Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut, Bozkurt (eds), Beyond A Divided Cyprus: A State and Society in Transformation, New York: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 47-66.
4 Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1992) Racialized Boundaries, New York: Routledge, and, ‘The Intersections of Class, Gender, Sexuality and “Race”: The Political Economy of Gendered Violence’, International Jour-nal of Politics, Culture, and Society 27 (2014), pp. 153–171.
5 It is listed among the top countries in the Global Militarization Index (GMI).
6 Dimitris Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
7 Eleni Varvitsioti, ‘Cyprus counts cost of weaker Russia ties after Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine’, Financial Times, 17 April 2022.
8 Theodoros Rakopoulos, Passport island: The market for EU citizenship in Cyprus, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2023.
9 Paul Hoffman, ‘Wealth Inequality in the 21st Century: Countries Where the Rich Have Gotten Richer Since the Year 2000’, 13 August 2025, https:// www.bestbrokers.com/forex-brokers/wealth-inequality-around-the-world-countries-where-the-rich-have-gotten-richer/.
10 Giorgos Charalambous, ‘The Greek-Cypriot far-right space, its histo-ry, and Elam’s trajectory’, in Katherine Kondor and Mark Littler (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe, London: Routledge, 2023, pp. 156-170.
11 Petros Kosmas, Antonis Theocharous, Elias Ioakimoglou et al.,‘Map-ping and Measuring the Phenomenon of Precariousness in the Labour Market’, Social Sciences 12(2), 2023, pp. 12, 61.
12 Gregoris Ioannou, Employment, Trade Unionism, and Class: The Labour Market in Southern Europe since the Crisis, London: Routledge, 1922.
13 Nicos Trimikliniotis,‘The Cyprus problem and imperial games in the hydrocarbon era: From a place of arms to an energy player?’, in Nicos Trimikliniotis andUmut Bozkurt, Beyond A Divided Cyprus, pp. 23-46.
14 EURES, 2025, ‘Labour Market Information: Cyprus’, European Employ-ment Services, 24 February 2025.
15 OECD,Policy Brief on Informal Entrepreneurship Entrepreneurial Activi-ties in Europe, European Union/OECD, 2015.
16 In the period between 1995 and 2004;see Louis Christofides, et al., ‘The Impact of Foreign Workers on the Labour Market of Cyprus’, Cyprus Economic Policy Review 1(2), 2007, pp. 37-49.
17 Floya Anthias and Gabriella Lazarides(eds), Into the Margins: Migration and Exclusion in Southern Europe, London: Routledge, 1999.
18 Giorgos Charalambous,‘The Strongest Communists in Europe: Account-ing for AKEL’s Electoral Success’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 23(3), pp. 425–456.
19 Most notable is the failure to support the Annan Plan in 2004 which damaged its relations with the Turkish-Cypriots.
20 Anthias and Ayres, ‘Ethnicity and Class in Cyprus’.
21 Anthias and Ayres, ‘Ethnicity and class in Cyprus’.
22 Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds), Woman-Nation-State,
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989.
23 Floya Anthias, Translocational Belongings: Intersectional Dilemmas and Social Inequalities, London: Routledge, 2020
24 Rolandos Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century,. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Cen-tre, 1996; Rolandos Katsiaounis, ‘Cyprus 1931-1959: The Politics of the Anti-colonial Movement’, Επετηρίδα, Nicosia: Cyprus Research 33, 2007, pp. 441-469.
25 Floya Anthias, ‘Race and Class Revisited — Conceptualising Race and Racisms’,The Sociological Review 38(1), 1990, pp. 19-42: Anthias,Trans-locational Belongings.
26 Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.
27 Anthias, Translocational Belongings.
28 See Michalis Attalides (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed, Nicosia: Jus Cypri, 1977; Peter Worsley and Paschalis Kitromilides (eds), Small States in the Modern World, Nicosia: SOGET, 1979.
29 See Nicos Trimikliniotis, ‘100 years of Sociology in Colonial and Post-Co-lonial Cyprus: Mapping Public Sociology and Critical Thought of a Small Divided Island-Country’, Cyprus Review 31(2), Fall 2019.
30 Frantz Fanon,The Wretched of the Earth, London: Penguin, 1961; Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, New York: Wiley, 2016.
31 Gurminder Bhambra and John Holmwood,Colonialism and Modern The-ory, Cambridge: Polity, 2021; Walter Mignolo and Catherine Walsh, On Decoloniality, Durham: Duke University Press, 2018.
32 Antonio M. Chiesi, ‘Back to social classes?’, Quaderni di Sociologia 88, XLVI (2022), pp. 3-33; Kirsteen Pato, ‘A Sociology of Class Without Feeling’, The Sociological Review 7 (April 2021); for the shortcomings, see Anthias,Translocational Belongings.
33 William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘Empire Preserv’d. How Americans put anticommunism before anti-imperialism’, Prasenjit Duarra (ed.),Decolonization: Perspectives From Then and Now, London: Routledge, 2004, pp.152-161.
34 Radha Kumar,‘The Troubled History of Partition’,Foreign Affairs 76(1), 1997,pp. 22–34; Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall?, London: Verso, 1999.
35 Floya Anthias and Ron Ayres, ‘National liberation and socialism: The case of Cyprus’, BSA Conference, 1979; Law, Ethnicity and Political struggle — Cyprus and its’ constitution”, paper for Conference, 1983; ‘Ethnicity and class in Cyprus’.
36 Anthias and Ayres, ‘Ethnicity and class in Cyprus’, p. 65.
37 ‘Titos Christofides: He made compromises for the sake of national unity’, in Natalia Kardash, Demetris Christofias, Nicosia: Vestnink Kypra, pp. 176-183.
38 Anthias and Yuval-Davis, Woman-Nation-State.
39 Robinson, Black Marxism, and Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Abolition Geog-raphy: Essays Towards Liberation, London: Verso, 2023. For a critique see Nikhil Pal Singh,‘Black Marxism and the Antinomies of Racial Cap-italism’, in Colleen Lye and Christopher Nealon (eds), After Marx, Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022, pp. 23-39, and Eren Duzgun, ‘Radicalising Global IR: Modernity, Capitalism, and the Question of Eu-rocentrism’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 15(3), Autumn 2022, pp. 313–333; Anthias, Translocational Belongings.
40 Anthias, Translocational Belongings.
41 Costas Eleftheriou,‘The Crisis in Syriza and the Prospects for the Radi-cal Left in Greece’, Transform!28, January 2025, https://transform-net-work.net/blog/analysis/the-crisis-in-syriza-and-the-prospects-for-the-radical-left-in-greece/.
42 Stathis Kouvelakis, ‘Syriza’s Rise and Fall’, New Left Review 97 (Janu-ary/February, 2016); Yiannos Katsourides, Radical Left Parties in Gov-ernment. The Cases of SYRIZA and AKEL, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
43 Giorgos Charalambous,‘Akel: A Sociopolitical Profile of Greek-Cypriot Communism’, in Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt. Beyond a Divided Cyprus.
44 Nicos Trimikliniotis,‘The national question, partition and geopolitics in the 21st century: the Cyprus problem, the social question and the poli-tics of reconciliation’, Global Discourse 18 (2/3), 2018, pp. 303-320.
45 Nicos Trimikliniotis, Migration and Refugee Dissensus in Europe, London: Routledge, 2020.
46 Anthias, Translocational Belongings.